What is an Information System? A Critical Perspective by Probert, Stephen
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
AMCIS 2004 Proceedings Americas Conference on Information Systems(AMCIS)
December 2004
What is an Information System? A Critical
Perspective
Stephen Probert
Cranfield University
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2004
This material is brought to you by the Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in AMCIS 2004 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Probert, Stephen, "What is an Information System? A Critical Perspective" (2004). AMCIS 2004 Proceedings. 541.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2004/541
Probert  What is an IS? A Critical Perspective 
What is an Information System? A Critical Perspective 
 
Stephen K. Probert 
Department of Information Systems 
Cranfield University 
Swindon SN6 8LA 
UK 
s.k.probert@cranfield.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT 
What is an information system? From a critical perspective, the object of research in Information Systems (IS) may prove to 
be highly problematic. This paper will explore some of the concepts necessary for the development of a critical interpretation 
of what an information system is. This critical interpretation will draw extensively on the notion of the reification - of both 
technological products and of the socio-economic environment in which IS development and use takes place. It will also 
draw on the notion of instrumental reason – insofar as it is relevant to IS development and use. The research implications of 
these ideas will then be discussed; in particular, how critical research into information systems development and use might 
proceed, given a critical interpretation– rather than positivistic or interpretivistic ontology of information systems. 
Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
What is an information system? If critical theory is relevant to IS research then this is a question which seems to demand an 
answer, because it is prima facie difficult to define a research programme if the research object is unclear. Therefore, it seems 
necessary to make the claim that a critical IS researcher should minimally have in mind a reasonable understanding of what 
an information system is. A critical perspective on IS research probably cannot consistently limit itself to epistemological and 
methodological questions taken in isolation. This is not to suggest that epistemological and methodological issues are 
unimportant, and some of these questions will now be discussed. 
BACKGROUND 
This paper will use Adorno’s work as its primary reference material. Theodor W. Adorno’s (1903-1969) was heavily 
influenced by the Germanic philosophical tradition emanating from Kant. Nietzsche, Hegel and Marx also play a role in the 
development of his ideas. However, he was also made aware of the traditions of philosophers such as Bertrand Russell 
(whilst in Oxford, England) and sociologists such as Robert Merton whilst in the United States. These influences are relevant, 
as Adorno was fully prepared to engage and grapple with these Anglo-Saxon ideas – something that many other continental 
academics rarely do. This makes his work especially relevant for IS research, most of which has been driven by an Anglo-
Saxon research agenda (positivism) – although a large number of “interpretivist” studies are also available in the IS literature. 
Both of these approaches make ontological assumptions about what an IS is. It will now be argued that these ontological 
assumptions are inadequate. For consistency, Adorno’s arguments will be used here, but other criticisms of these approaches 
have also been made. 
POSITIVISM 
Although much IS research has been carried out in this tradition, Adorno was acutely aware of the limitations of this 
approach (generally). A thorough analysis of the epistemological arguments for Adorno’s rejection of positivism is not 
warranted here, but relevant arguments will now be explored. Firstly, it is an uncritical method, secondly, it methodologically 
prevents genuine thought and reflection on the actual situations being investigated, and thirdly, it presumes that the past is a 
guide to the future. 
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Positivism as Uncritical 
Firstly then, positivism is modelled on the natural sciences, and the natural sciences are concerned with “the facts” which are 
always (supposedly) value-free. In positivism’s claim to discover facts lies its strongest appeal. However, the facts about how 
(e.g.) a virus does its damage to people cannot be connected to any intention on the part of the virus to cause human suffering 
- whereas, in the social sphere, deliberate human actions occur. Deliberate human actions arise from intentions – good, bad or 
indifferent. E.G. a medical intervention on a diseased patient arises from an intention to cure the patient. These intentions and 
the society in which they are both acted out and shaped by is clearly not a value-free arena. Positivism’s claim to discover the 
“value-free facts” (which is also its appeal) has to be methodologically grounded in a sort-of feigned ignorance of the social 
issues (the power struggles, the ideological elements, and so on) that are actually present in the situations under study: 
“In societal and concrete terms, both political apathy and the much-praised scientific 
neutrality prove to be political facts. Ever since Pareto, positivistic scepticism has come 
to terms with the specific existing power, even that of Mussolini. Since every social 
theory is interwoven with real society, every social theory can certainly be misused 
ideologically or operationalised in a distorted manner. Positivism, however, specifically 
lends itself, in keeping with the entire nominalist-sceptical tradition, to ideological abuse 
by virtue of its material indeterminacy, its classificatory method and, finally, its 
preference for correctness rather than truth.” (Adorno, 1976, p. 30). 
(Rigour and relevance could easily be substituted for correctness and truth here.) However, this argument is not entirely 
decisive. Feigned ignorance (of the value-aspects) does not necessarily imply genuine ignorance. Put simply, many 
researchers in the positivist tradition would manifestly not be sympathetic to fascism! However, Adorno’s methodological 
point is entirely apposite in IS research (in my view); much of which makes great use of the “freedom” allowed by positivism 
to completely ignore the social issues in IS development (implementation and use, for that matter). However, as Adorno 
indicates above, although it “lends itself” to so-doing (or “so-ignoring”) it need not necessarily do so. 
Positivism as a “Prohibition on Thinking” 
Secondly, the entire positivist tradition rests on its claim to be able to prove (or disprove) things; what cannot be proved, 
cannot be known and (a true positivist would / should argue). However, a great many of the social aspects in IS are simply 
not amenable to being proved in this way. Rhetoric, exaggeration, phoney justifications and face-saving excuses for failure 
are part-and-parcel of the IS development world. Few experienced practitioners would deny this, but positivism-as-
methodology has no (or very little) access to these features. Methodologically, because such aspects are difficult to prove 
they must be literally denied by positivists (especially in their published work): 
“Especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries logical positivism, originally inaugurated by 
the Vienna circle, has gained ground to the point of becoming a virtual monopoly. Many 
consider it modern in the sense of being the most rigorous faculty of enlightenment, 
adequate to the so-called technical-scientific age. Whatever does not conform to it is 
relegated to the status of residual metaphysics, its own unrecognised mythology or, in the 
terminology of those who know nothing of art, art.” (Adorno, 1998, p. 8) 
As Adorno argues, that which does not produce fact is (often) not considered to be a bona fide research method (by many 
people at any rate). However, although to define critical awareness precisely is extremely difficult to do in anything 
resembling a “scientific” manner, it would seem to be vital in IS research. This is partly - but not entirely - because of the 
economic context (and the praise/blame, reward/punishment) associated with success or failure in the actual business 
environment in which IS development generally takes place. With positivism, “[T]hinking becomes a necessary evil and is 
broadly discredited. Thinking loses its element of independence. The autonomy of reason vanishes: the part of reason that 
exceeds the subordinate reflection upon and adjustment to pre-given data. With it, however, goes the conception of freedom 
and, potentially, the self-determination of human society.” (Adorno, 1998, p. 9). IS development (and use) is a complex 
social process to which positivistic research approaches have only limited access. 
Positivism and Change 
Thirdly, an objection can be made concerning positivism that is of clear relevance in IS research. Put simply, positivism tells 
us about the past (albeit the “brute facts” about the past), but why should the past be a guide to the future – especially in 
social analyses? Clearly, with a modicum of reflection, it will be seen that the idea that the past can be guide to the future is 
an assumption – and a particularly dangerous one in IS research. As Jarvis puts it: 
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“Positivism is criticised, not because it pays too much attention to experience, but 
because it is not attentive enough. Reports on present and past experience are construed 
as ‘laws’ and allowed to legislate over future experience. The putative pure description of 
positivism carries an ineliminable prescriptive moment within it. Positivism becomes the 
liquidation of the new, of the possibility that the facts might change.” (Jarvis, 1998, p. 88) 
Perhaps the key word in all of this is ‘change’. If people wish to change the future for the better, then it is necessary to have 
in mind how they might change it, and in what way, when designing their research programmes. Researchers in the 
positivistic research tradition may well have such notions in mind when designing their research programmes, but they may 
not be able to articulate such notions within their research; strictly speaking, such ideas are at best superfluous. In the worst 
cases, there may be some idea or other along the lines of the powerful exerting greater power over the powerless than 
hitherto. Even if such sentiments are made reasonably obvious in written-up research, positivistic research cannot be 
criticised on such grounds (by positivists at any rate). A critical view of an IS will generally be of a complex set of entities 
which are capable of being arranged differently than they actually are; which could be otherwise – and could therefore be 
changed. 
 “INTERPRETIVISM” 
 Of necessity, Adorno does not see “interpretivism” à la Checkland (1981), Stowell, (1993) and many, many others as some 
sort of panacea to positivism. Albeit for entirely different reasons, it is seen as equally misguided, as the following quotation 
makes plain: 
“Sociology is only peripherally concerned with the ends-mean relation subjectively 
carried out by actors. It is more concerned with the laws realized through and against 
such intentions. Interpretation is the opposite of the subjective meaning endowment on 
the part of the knowing subject or of the social actor. The concept of such meaning 
endowment leads to an affirmative fallacy that the social process and social order are 
reconciled with the subject and justified as something intelligible by the subject or 
belonging to the subject. A dialectical concept of meaning would not be a correlate of 
Weber’s meaningful understanding but rather the societal essence which shapes 
appearances, appears in them and conceals itself in them.” (Adorno, 1976. p. 37 
[emphases added). 
There may well be many “viewpoints” on any given social situation. Whilst many of these may be entirely reasonable, some 
of these may well be riddled with racism, fascism and so on. Merely to accept any viewpoint as passively “valid” or 
“interesting” (or whatnot) misses the point entirely; often it is not the viewpoint that matters but the social forces that 
generate that viewpoint which need to be understood. Most people are aware of the kinds of viewpoints expressed by Adolf 
Hitler and his supporters. These are not in themselves particularly “interesting” or “informative” (or whatnot). What will be 
interesting and informative are precisely the specific social and psychological circumstances and affectations that led to the 
manifestations of such viewpoints; viewpoints that may have dire consequences if / when they are “operationalised”. The 
critical researcher needs to be critical rather than passive about the viewpoints expressed in (e.g.) action research-style IS 
case studies. Again, a kind of feigned detachment is advocated and effected in interpretivism; namely that the researcher 
should be indifferent to the views expressed by the actors in the study. The critical researcher is, however, encouraged to both 
be alarmed at certain viewpoints and encouraged to develop theories concerning the circumstances which have led to their 
generation. It is important to note that such viewpoints that may cause genuine concern need not be nearly as extreme as the 
examples given above; the principle remains true. 
Positivism and Interpretivism 
Adorno argued “viewpoints” (or whatever one wants to call them) are only relevant as the objects of research. For Adorno, 
subjectivism provides the ideological basis of fascism – period. Exactly why this should be is rather difficult and complex to 
explain, but it can be most simply explained logically. If there really are no facts about the matter for a complex social 
situation, then anything goes – it is all a ‘matter of opinion’ (or some such phrase). If this is assumed, then it follows that 
person A’s opinion can have no privileged status over person B’s, and in that case fascist ideology is absolutely on the same 
epistemological level as that of the liberal theorist, or the critical theorist. The critical theorist has to begin critically, with an 
inquisitive approach to the viewpoints expressed in a given social situation. (Adorno used the phrase critical subjectivity to 
characterise this approach.) However, apposite critical theories can, in fact, arise from (reflections upon) positivistic research 
work. Empirical studies can provide important questions and help inform theories in critical IS research. Indeed, without 
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empirical studies it would be quite impossible to even have a basic idea as to what was currently taking place in the IS world. 
Fads and fashion are well-known phenomena in IS developments in the world of business (and the public sector, for that 
matter). But the extent of the take-up of such phenomena will need to be informed by empirical studies; therefore to deny the 
importance of empirical studies would be to make the same sort of (abstract) “category mistake” as is made by both 
positivists and interpretivists – to deny the importance of a crucial aspect of actual IS research. The critical theorist cannot 
hope to provide a critical interpretation of (e.g.) dot-com euphoria (and dot-bomb despair!) without a fair statistical 
understanding of the actual situation - which obviously changes over time. One cannot just armchair-theorise the actual 
situations in which IS developments take place. Nevertheless, potentially, new IS developments can be conceived of in ways 
that have not been hitherto1.  
TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 
A detailed analysis of Adorno’s view on both technology and society would be of value to the would-be critical researcher 
intending to use the ideas herein. However, both topics would really require extensive treatment – not possible within the 
scope of this paper. Therefore, what will be attempted will be a characterisation of information systems which adequately 
captures the nature of an information system in a manner appropriate for the critical researcher to progress. This analysis will 
be based on two key ideas – both central to Adorno’s thought. These are; firstly, the notion of instrumental reason and 
secondly the notion of a society as a “real illusion”. 
Instrumental Reason 
In the earlier discussion on positivism and change, it was argued that some notion of how things ought to be in the future 
should (at least) accompany – and potentially drive – an IS research programme. Adorno goes further than this – his whole 
characterisation of reason per se is based on an argument that reason cannot be divorced from intention. He argued that 
philosophers from Husserl right back to Descartes have either ignored or denied this aspect of reason. The thinking behind 
Adorno’s contention is complex, and so a simplified version of this argument will be given here. This discussion is included 
so that an understanding of the key notion of instrumental reason can be provided, which is germane to the characterisation of 
an information system being developed here. As society has developed - from the middle ages (or earlier) to the late capitalist 
society of today – man has been increasingly unable to identify the connections between the causes of reasoning and 
reasoning itself. However, the stubborn refusal of the causes of reasoning - what Hume called ‘the passions’ - to disappear 
from epistemological thought is still detectable in modern philosophy from Descartes through to Husserl (Adorno may have 
first encountered these ideas whilst studying Hegel, for whom they are a central theme.) In particular, Adorno considered that 
Husserl’s valiant attempts to do just this, in his phenomenology, had failed (Adorno, 1982). Here, a discussion of 
phenomenology will be avoided, because – for many (especially, but not exclusively, in the IS world) – phenomenology is 
understood to be supportive of weltanschaaungsphilosophie (or “worldview” philosophy); this is a highly contentious reading 
(Probert, 1998). The conclusion Adorno draws is that – rather than pursue a philosophical programme of “pure reason” - 
where ‘pure’ is taken to mean ‘uncontaminated’ - a programme of dialectical reasoning should be pursued. This programme 
should set out to elaborate what dialectical reasoning should be (or attempt to be, etc.). This is most fully attempted by 
Adorno in Adorno (1973). The attempts from Descartes through to Husserl to define a “pure” reason are, Adorno argues, 
unsuccessful; however they demonstrate a desire to define and characterise reason as if it had no context of human intention. 
(N.B. the phrase ‘intention’ is used herein in its commonplace, everyday sense; it is not used in the technical sense introduced 
by Husserl.) This desire is the result of various social conditions which have isolated ourselves from properly understanding 
our own desires, i.e. we have become alienated from these in a sense similar (although not identical) to that proposed by 
Hegel: 
“[O]n Kant’s view of human nature, human beings are eternally divided between their 
reason and their brute desires. It’s like the old picture of Man as halfway between the 
apes and the angels. Now for Kant it is just a fact of human nature that we will always be 
torn between these two aspects of our nature. But Hegel denied that this was immutable. 
He looked at human nature in historical terms. In ancient Greece, Hegel said, human 
nature was more harmonious. People were not conscious of any conflict between their 
desires and their reason. So the division that Kant saw must be something that has 
occurred historically, it need not be a permanent feature… By ‘alienation’ Hegel meant 
                                                          
1 Exactly how and why this process should occur is an area for further research; some tentative suggestions as to how such 
research might proceed were outlined in an earlier paper by the author (Probert 2002). 
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the idea that something which is in fact ourselves or part of ourselves seems to us foreign, 
alien and hostile… The end point in the [Hegelian] dialectical process is Mind … seeing 
everything that it took to be foreign and hostile to itself as in fact part of itself.” (Singer, 
1987, pp. 191-196). 
Adorno’s characterisation of this sense of isolation / alienation also has a lot in common with Durkheim’s notion of ‘anomie’; 
this can be characterised thus: 
“The problem with existing industrial capitalist societies in Durkheim’s view was that … 
the division of labour was artificial and forced. Consequently, there was widespread 
‘anomie’ – an absence of recognised and positively accepted norms to regulate action, 
and in Marx’s terms “alienation” due to “forced” division of labour… According to 
Durkheim, the prevalence of anomie … showed that the line of development of the 
division of labour had deviated from its “logical” course. The current line of development 
taken by industrial / capitalist societies seemed to him to be “abnormal” or 
“pathological”, because it deviated from the path of developing organic solidarity… due 
to an over-rapid industrialisation and unequal distribution of power between the groups or 
classes involved. Inequality was particularly evident in the relations between classes, 
because those who had only their labour to offer were in a weaker position when entering 
a contract than those who had the accumulated resources to purchase their labour…” 
(Thompson, 1982, p. 80). 
Adorno’s characterisation of this sense of isolation / alienation is also closely connected with (similar) socio-economic 
considerations to those of Durkheim. 
Pure reason? 
The search for a “pure” reason, devoid of intention, whilst ultimately unsuccessful, has nevertheless found many receptive 
audiences over the years, because of the social conditions and conventions which actually operate (i.e. those of late 
capitalism). What philosophical programmes such as Kant’s and Husserl’s attempt to achieve has already become the 
dominant form of modern rationality, precisely because the feeling that (critical) reasoning is linked with desires, many of 
which have no basis in rationality, is no longer felt by many. What is left (the “residue”) is a reasoning which is practically 
devoid of any real purposes at all, i.e. an instrumental reason which lacks any real aim. Positivism is an example of this. As 
Jarvis puts it: 
“The central argument is that reason has become irrational precisely because of its 
attempt to expel every non-rational moment from itself. In this way, reason becomes 
incapable of understanding what makes rationality itself possible, the non-rational 
element which reason depends upon. The consequence is a kind of rationality which is a 
tool, blindly applied without any real capacity either to reflect on the ends to which it is 
applied, or to recognise the particular qualities of the objects to which it is applied. 
Adorno and Horkheimer call this unreflective rationality instrumental reason.” (Jarvis, 
1998, p. 13-14) 
“Technological” reasoning generally, can be seen as a modern extension of instrumental reason; instrumental reason has no 
purpose whatsoever – until it is given one. This assignment-to-purpose may be entirely arbitrary, but - more generally - it will 
tend towards to the preservation of the socio-economic status quo (at the macro level), for reasons which will be discussed 
shortly. Computers and organisational information systems can be seen (for this purpose at any rate) as technological 
embodiments of instrumental reason. They will need to be paid for, and the justification for so doing will generally be 
couched in (ultimately) economic terms. In a business context, this justification will naturally be linked to the profit 
imperative. (In other spheres such as leisure-uses, the justification for such purchases will vary accordingly.) Interestingly, it 
is (fairly) obvious that computers have no purpose(s) until such purposes are assigned, and that the provision of information 
is just one possible assignation - others purposes could be to edit a video recording or to keep an aircraft in stable flight. 
Organisational information systems usually include the application of such technologies - subordinated to the profit 
imperative inherent in late-capitalist societies. 
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“Real illusions” and the Reification of Socio-Economic environment 
Adorno’s ideas concerning society - as an object of study and as an object to be transformed - are closely related with his 
epistemological and methodological ideas. As seen earlier, Adorno is critical of Weber; he is also critical of Durkheim. Jarvis 
summarises the argument thus: 
“Weber argued that social institutions and processes had to be understood through the 
subjective self-understanding of individuals participating in them, without whom these 
processes would be nothing at all. The merit of this approach, for Adorno, is its refusal to 
present social relations which are historical and produced as though they were simply 
objects ‘given’ to sociological study in the same way that data are arguably given to 
natural science. The difficulty with it is that Weber underestimated the extent to which in 
modern society social relations take on a life of their own. Under capitalism ... social 
relations, which are indeed made by human individuals and which would be nothing 
without those individuals, have taken on an apparently autonomous and objective 
existence. It is indeed illusory to think that social relations could be presented as wholly 
autonomous from the relating individuals. Yet the autonomy of social relations is not 
simply a mistake, but a ‘real illusion’.” (Jarvis, 1998, pp. 45-46) 
This argument implies that social relations are understandable, because the “object” of study (society) is locked into fixed, 
predictable ways of behaving – at a suitable level of abstraction. The logic of the economics of the firm makes profit 
possible, and will continue to do so for years to come. Accountancy conventions are effectively static. Information systems 
themselves are locked into this socially rigid situation, and therefore may themselves take on the appearance of being real - 
which, in a sense, they are (as discussed earlier). That is, they are real illusions, and may be analysed as such without 
recourse to subjective considerations. It will be worth making the point here that Adorno is not concerned with the ways that 
organisations change as the needs of the customer, or the internal business processes vary (or whatnot). At a fairly deep, 
abstract level the basic logic of the organisation and management of the firm does not change; these basic social-
organisational structures are imbedded in (e.g.) the financial information systems of any firm. In this sense, when traditional 
systems analysis textbooks talk about analysing “the current system”, the current system really is there to be analysed in this 
way, and without much recourse to the subjective meanings attributed to people working in the firm. Even an (apparently) 
entirely new system (e.g. a new Customer Relationship Management system) will tend to absorb this “logic” from the 
surrounding socio-economic climate, as will systems related to business process improvements. Although a myriad of 
information systems may exist in an organisation, they will all tend to be subordinated to the all-pervasive socio-economic 
logic. Indeed, it has been cogently argued that even if they do not do so, they should do; even by some of those who advocate 
of a more balanced approach to the measurement of organisational performance: 
“Building a balanced scorecard should encourage business units to link their financial 
objectives to corporate strategy. The financial objectives serve as the focus for the 
objectives and measures in all the other scorecard perspectives. Every measure selected 
should be part of a link of cause-and-effect relationships that culminate in improving 
financial performance. The scorecard should tell the story of the strategy, starting with 
the long-run financial objectives, and then linking them to the sequence of actions that 
must be taken with financial processes, customers, internal processes, and finally 
employees and systems to deliver the desired long-run economic performance… 
Financial objectives and measures must play a dual role: they define the financial 
performance expected from the strategy, and they serve as the ultimate targets for the 
objectives and measures of all the other scorecard perspectives.” (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996, pp. 47-48) 
Organisational information systems generally, will in this way be more or less tied to the profit imperative within a firm2. To 
the extent that they are so-tied, these information systems are real illusions, and therefore - in an equally important way – 
such information systems have no existence that is independent of the social actors in the firm: 
“Social relations are no longer interpretable as the sum of the subjects participating in and 
making them. Durkheim’s contribution, against Weber, is to point to this. The merit of 
                                                          
2 Information systems in public sector and charitable organisations may well differ from this in important ways, as Kaplan 
and Norton (1996) recognise (see pp. 179-188). This could be a subject for further research. 
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his approach is that it testifies to the real preponderance of petrified social relations over 
individuals... Yet Durkheim, conversely, pays insufficient attention to the illusory 
character of the objectivity of social relations.” (Jarvis, 1998, p. 46). 
The world in which IS research takes place is fundamentally one of stable (“petrified”) macro-social relations, which 
potentially could change, but almost certainly will not – at least overnight. Thus information systems are - as social 
institutions are more generally - real illusions. This is not to say that information needs are not dynamic (which they clearly 
often are), but it is to say that the fundamental social processes which underpin information systems use are not tangibly 
dynamic - although in principle they could be. Therefore, for all practical purposes, positivism will be effective in finding out 
“facts” about information systems, but it also becomes part of the process which fosters the further petrification of those facts 
too. Methodologically, the critical researcher will need to keep these “facts” in scare-quotes. Indeed, this will be difficult in 
practice as the dominant positivistic view is so prevalent in IS research. Here, the commonplace understanding of IS is 
simply a sub-set (or an example of) the commonplace understanding of (reified) society more generally: 
“Social appearance, the second nature of petrified social relations, is taken for the essence 
of society, for all there is or can ever be. For epistemological positivism the notion of 
essence is a metaphysical relic which must be liquidated; appearance is what there is. For 
sociological positivism the corollary is that an objective concept of society is a 
metaphysical relic.” (Jarvis, 1998, p. 67). 
Of course, an objectively real society is, on this account, not something which can be known - but it can be aspired to. 
Similarly, merely identifying information systems as real illusions will not be sufficient to change them. As Jarvis puts it, a 
real illusion, “cannot be dispelled simply by recognising it as such.” (Jarvis, 1998, p. 68). Given the versatility of computers, 
the prospects for information systems development are (typically, given this analysis) simultaneously both encouraging and 
discouraging. They are encouraging, in that what is often considered to be objectively necessary may be seen as nothing other 
than the pseudo-imperatives stemming from these real illusions. However, the prospects are discouraging in that such real 
illusions, these petrified / reified social relations are very hard to change. The critical IS researcher may bring new a new 
agenda to the IS research community, by insisting that no description of IS practice is complete without some prescriptions 
concerning what such practice should be aiming at. Both the positivist and interpretive traditions have, to date, largely 
ignored what is required from a critical perspective. If Adorno’s characterisations of rationality and society are (largely) 
correct, then there is (or there should be!) the opportunity within IS research to embrace what ought to be in the future, when 
analysing what is actually occurring within IS development and use today. Nonetheless, there may well be real and important 
changes occurring in the (macro) socio-economic environment in which IS development and use takes place; some of these 
changes may be barely perceptible, but nevertheless real. Several of these changes were briefly discussed in an earlier paper 
by the author (Probert, 2003), but further discussion of these is not warranted here. 
THE REIFICATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
From a critical perspective - the entire capitalist system depends on the ability to identify and thereby commodify objects in 
such a way that they can be both costed and priced (Adorno, 1973). Information systems (again, prima facie) resist easy 
costing and pricing. Interestingly, it follows from this paradox that the multifarious budgetary problems (IS development 
being frequently late and over budget, etc.) will continue to plague the industry of IS development. Furthermore, if 
information systems indeed resist easy identification then they do not seem to resist fetishisation in the way that a 
straightforward Marxist account of commodification would suggest. The lack of easy identification criteria for information 
systems would imply their resistance to commodification – this may in part explain the fetishisation of (e.g.) ERP systems. 
One lesson that might be learned from the dot-com boom, it is the extent to which capital providers are prepared to risk their 
capital on investments in objects which cannot be defined, identified or commodified in any meaningful way! Whether 
“history will repeat itself” in this respect (when the next IT-enable fad arrives) must remain an open question, for although a 
positivist must assume that the past legislates for the future, a critical theorist need not – indeed probably cannot consistently 
- do so. At any rate, thus far, the discussion has focussed on what an information system is. This, however, it not the same as 
answering the question ‘what does an information system seem to be?’ This question needs an answer too - because various 
possible answers can be given, and decisions made - as to how to manage an IS, etc. - depend in part upon the answer that is 
actually given. In an organisational setting, an IS can be (and sometimes is) seen as both the product of human labour (on 
technological artefacts such as computers) and the process of labouring on the resultant “products” themselves. Textbook 
definitions of the elementary kind usually tend towards product-type definitions, whilst more reflective IS texts usually 
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include process elements too3. The product-like, or commodity-like, appearance of (or metaphor for) information systems is 
possible because the possible product-like appearance of any object is deeply-ingrained in the psyche of “Westernised” 
people. However, it is worth considering just how strange this idea of a product or commodity can be made to seem. Marx 
was the first to problematise the product as such. Although his remarks on this were rather fleeting, they are relevant here: 
“The mystery of the commodity form, therefore, consists in the fact that in it the social 
character of men’s, labour appears to them as an objective characteristic, a social natural 
quality of the labour product itself… The commodity form, and the value relation 
between the products of labour which stamp them as commodities, have absolutely no 
connection with their physical properties and with the material relations arising 
therefrom. It is simply a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, 
the fantastic form of a relation between things… This I call the fetishism which attaches 
itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which 
is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities.” (Marx, 1867, cited in 
Bottomore, 1991, p. 463). 
Clearly, some process which could be described as fetishisation is at the very least germane to a critical understanding of IS, 
as time-after-time case studies indicate a tendency on the part of managers to naively believe that information systems can be 
purchased “off the shelf” in the same way that a product such as a can of baked beans can be. The critical conclusion to be 
drawn is that information systems resist commodification - as any sensible definition of an IS must include the organisational 
process issues concerning how the data produced by the IT is used, and how the IS itself is reconfigured in response to these 
process issues (themselves) and the changing internal and external demands on the organisation. Notwithstanding this 
argument, most definitions do not place enough emphasis on the reification aspects of an IS, and this is in need of correction. 
Therefore, an IS is not a product, for two reasons. Firstly, even if an IS is considered to be a product to begin with (as an ERP 
system might be so-considered) it will not endure without on-going labour processes occurring. Secondly – more 
fundamentally – products themselves are nothing over-and-above the labour processes which produce them; the tendency to 
see products as something over-and-above those labour processes which produce them is, precisely, the reifying tendency 
present in the psyche of Westernised people. This is something a critical theorist should resist. These considerations have 
important epistemological implications - and these are the subject of further research by the author, as the problem of the 
commodity-like appearance of an information system is most likely a rather special case of the problem of commodities in 
general. As Marx put it: 
“[T]he existence of the things qua commodities, and the value relation between the 
products of labour which stamp them as commodities, have absolutely no connection 
with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is 
a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a 
relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to 
the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the 
human brain appear as independent things endowed with life, and entering into relation 
both with one another and the human race. So it is in the commodities with the products 
of men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, 
so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the 
production of commodities.” (Marx, 1867, p. 436) 
As such, the question ‘what does an IS seem to be?’ - has a difficult and seemingly paradoxical answer. Even if an IS could 
be coherently conceived of as a commodity, this would only further obscure its real nature. Nevertheless, it can be 
conjectured that, as we are all familiar with commodities (in the sense described above), and given the illusory character of 
actual information systems – it is unsurprising that many managers find it convenient to treat information systems as if they 
                                                          
3 Although numerous trite examples could be cited here, I believe it would be unfair to criticise academic authors for 
producing rather basic definitions of what an information system is, in what are usually intended as introductory texts in the 
subject; if criticism is due it should perhaps be reserved for those authors who would claim to be making more profound - but 
nevertheless highly dubious - statements as to what an information system is. 
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were commodities4. The extent to which they do so, and the consequences of doing so, are potential areas for further 
research. 
CONCLUSION 
Conceived of critically, information systems, can be seen (in part) as the social embodiment of technological rationality via 
(in many cases) technological artefacts such as computers. The labour-processes that both create and sustain information 
systems (usually) contribute to the reproduction of the society in which they are developed. The critical theorist may allow 
for other possibilities as to what information systems may aim at, include emancipatory aims, as, “[T]he uncompromisingly 
critical thinker, who neither superscribes his conscience nor permits himself to be terrorised into action, is in truth the one 
who does not give up. Furthermore, thinking is not the spiritual reproduction of that which exists. As long as thinking is not 
interrupted, it has a firm grasp upon possibility.” (Adorno, 1991, p. 174). Even if the opportunities for emancipatory IS 
developments are limited in the actual world; the theoretical possibilities exist, and may endure (or even improve). This 
analysis has – for the sake of clarity – necessarily restricted itself to an account of the socio-economic environment which has 
treated it as static at the macro-level, whilst being simultaneously dynamic at the micro-level – in precisely the same ways 
that Kaplan and Norton (1996), and many others regard it. Notwithstanding this, further research is required on the subtle 
changes that are (or at least may be) taking place in the environment for IS development and use. Some directions as to the 
form that such research might take are provided in Probert (2003). 
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